






















































 Secessionism and Minority Protection





With the changing economic circumstances confronting their countries, regionally
concentrated minorities have been facing a strategic problem, important aspects of
which can be stylized as a situation in which a minority leader is uncertain about
the costs of secession for her community. This paper shows that this uncertainty
is a central cause of secession, using a model which incorporates both policies to
appease secessionist aspirations and informational asymmetries. In a situation of
asymmetric information, in which the policy-maker is better informed about the con-
sequences of separation than the minority leader, signaling incentives make secession
the unique equilibrium outcome, whether mutually advantageous compromises exist
or not. We also show that the ruling majority may seek to maintain political unity by
pre-committing to minority protection rules which prevent bluﬃng by the informed
policy-maker. Additionally, the model generates comparative statics results on the
question of which states are most likely to adopt constitutional rules protecting the
minorities living within their borders.
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11 Introduction
It is now well known that the evolution of the international system in terms of economic
integration and defense requirements is conducive to secession in multicultural states (e.g.,
Polèse 1985, Alesina et al. 2000). By reducing the economic and security advantages of
integration, changes in the international climate tend to make political independence an
increasingly viable alternative for geographically concentrated minorities. In such a con-
text, if disgruntled regional minorities possess the power to withdraw, central governments
must preempt secession attempts by adopting compromise policies which satisfy, if only
partially, their demands. The outcomes of these attempts to appease secessionist minori-
ties are diverse. There is variation, ﬁrst, in whether they result in continued integration
in the existing state or in secession. If political integration is preserved, there is also vari-
ation in the nature of the policy compromises themselves, and some governments seem
to do better than others in their eﬀorts to maintain their political predominance without
inducing secession (see, e.g., Bartkus 1999, and Pavković and Radan 2007).
What explains the outcomes of secession crises? What determines whether a secession
crisis will end in compromise or in separation? And why do some governments, when faced
with separatist threats, adopt policies that do little to assuage (and sometimes cultivate)
separatist aspirations, whereas others implement institutional arrangements that grant
regionally concentrated minorities special forms of political representation and protection
(Lustick et al., 2004)? We address these questions by focusing on the strategic incentives
created the lack of information that citizens often have about the economic beneﬁts of
integration and the consequences of separation. This uncertainty creates an informational
asymmetry between governments and secessionist minorities: Governments have access
to much better information on the economic beneﬁts of unity than the citizenry at large
(Persson et al. 1997, Besley 2006), and would very much like regional minorities to believe
that political independence will be prohibitively costly.
A central result of the paper is that uncertainty about the consequences of secession
and the signaling process it engenders are major determinants of the decision to secede.
Our essential argument is outlined as follows. Consider a country with two economically
2interdependent regions, one of which is populated by an ethnic minority with secession po-
tential. In the initial stage, a governing policy-maker representing the majority proposes a
policy compromise to the minority. A minority leader must then decide whether this com-
promise is acceptable, that is, whether she prefers the minority region to accept the new
policy rather than secede. The acceptability of a policy depends on the relative economic
strengths of the two regions, which determine their respective costs of separation. The
policy-maker can ascertain these costs, while the regional leader cannot, but both under-
stand that an economically stronger majority region implies that: (i) the policy-maker is
less willing to compromise to avoid separation, and (ii) the minority’s net cost of secession
increases, as the majority region becomes a more valuable economic partner. The best
strategy for the policy-maker is to signal high secession costs for the minority by demand-
ing policy concessions from the minority too exacting to be acceptable if secession costs
were in fact lower. This strategy is optimal for the following reason. Policy compromises
are relatively more costly to an economically stronger majority region, and the policy-
maker is more likely to make demanding proposals when the majority region is strong.
Understanding this, the uninformed leader rationally infers higher costs of secession from
more demanding policy proposals. Such beliefs lead the policy-maker to go too far, how-
ever, and to demand concessions that the minority leader has no intention of making. As
a consequence, whether mutually advantageous compromises exist or not, secession is an
inevitable outcome when citizens are uncertain about regions’ capabilities. Conversely, if
citizens are fully informed and mutually advantageous compromises exist, secession never
occurs: The minority leader knows her reservation value, and likewise the policy-maker
knows how much he must concede to avoid secession.
To prevent secession would require a technology in which the majority could commit not
to set too demanding policies up front. Only by committing to this can signaling incentives
be curbed. Another result of the paper is that (obdurate) constitutional laws protecting
minorities against exploitative policies can prevent secession. Indeed, such constitutional
arrangements place a limit on the policy concessions the policy-maker may try to extract.
This suggests that majority groups — worried about the danger that their representative
3policy-maker might become locked into a signaling process leading to secession — can ﬁnd
minority protection arrangements proﬁtable from an ex ante point of view.1
To explore this possibility, we analyze the choice of constitution-maker representing
the interests of the majority region, who ex ante must choose minority protection laws.
The beneﬁt of this analysis is a set of comparative statics results that provide insights
into the questions of which states are most likely to adopt constitutional arrangements for
protecting minorities living within their borders, and which minorities are most likely to
secede. Unsurprisingly, we ﬁnd that regardless of the other parameters, minorities more
attached to political independence are always more likely to secede. The intuition is that
the higher the intrinsic desire for independence, the higher the minority’s opportunity cost
of integration and then the more costly for the majority are the constitutional arrangements
required to preserve unity.
The size of the minority (relative to that of the majority) has an ambiguous eﬀect
on minority protection and the risk of secession. The reason is that in choosing initially
whether to prevent a secession or not, the constitution-maker will take into account the
nature of the minimum arrangements that would dissuade the minority from seceding.
For example, suppose these arrangements allow exploitative policies (i.e., the value of
independence for the minority is small relative to its economic cost). Then an increase in
the relative size of the minority increases the constitution-maker’s willingness to protect
the minority and reduce the risk of secession, for it raises the beneﬁts from exploiting
the minority. In contrast, if the constitutional arrangements really protect the minority,
then an increase in the relative size of the minority increases the costs of protection and
therefore the risk of secession.
Finally, the eﬀect of citizens’ initial beliefs about the relative strengths of the two
regions hinges on the relative potency of two opposing eﬀects. First, as the majority region
1This is reminiscent of Acemoglu and Robinson (2001). Using a complete-information stochastic game,
they show how durable constitutional restrictions on taxation can be used by a poor majority to commit
to low taxes in the future, and thus dissuade the rich elite from undertaking a coup against the prevailing
democratic regime. In the present paper, however, it is not uncertainty itself that makes constitutional
limitations attractive to the majority, but the informational asymmetries it creates.
4is believed to be economically stronger, the expected cost of separation for the minority
increases, thus reducing the cost of preserving unity for the majority. At the same time,
separation is expected to be less damaging to the majority which is consequently less
willing to compromise. The net eﬀect depends on the shape of preferences.
The importance of asymmetric information in secessionism has already been recognized
by Olofsgård (2004) who shows how signaling phenomena may drive moderate minorities
to appoint extreme secessionist leaders. The model presented here is closely related to
Olofsgård’s, but diﬀers in two important respects. Firstly, the focus is mainly on the
dyadic interaction between the policy-maker and the minority leader and, in particular,
there is no distinction between the latter and any other member of the minority. Secondly,
the costs of separation for the two regions are negatively correlated: Owing to economic
interdependence, if a region becomes economically stronger, then separation becomes less
damaging to this region but more damaging to the other region which loses a more pre-
cious economic partner. Recent empirical work in political science, such as Walter (2006),
has also emphasized the role of uncertainty and governments’ incentives to misrepresent
information in secession crises.2
The seminal contribution to the strategic theory of policy choice under the threat of
secession is due to Buchanan and Faith (1987). More recent analytical work includes
Bolton and Roland (1997), Fearon and van Houten (2002), and Olofsgård (2003, 2004),
and Gradstein (2004), among others. With the exception of Olofsgård (2004), those pa-
pers analyze models of complete information, in which the consequences of secession are
perfectly known to the citizens. More distantly related to this paper is the political econ-
omy literature on the size of nations; see Spolaore (2006) and the references therein for
an exhaustive account. In particular, Le Breton and Weber (2003), and Haimanko et al.
(2005) use the framework of Alesina and Spolaore (1997) — in which groups of individuals
can unilaterally withdraw from an existing state and create their own country — to study
how interregional transfers can prevent secession. Nevertheless, citizens do not anticipate
2The political science literature has also emphasized the role of incomplete information in civil wars
(Fearon, 1995). In particular, Dal Bó and Powell (2009) study the eﬀects of uncertainty and signaling on
the probability of civil war in a model of “spoils politics.”
5the risk of secession in their model, for they assume that the political process within any
country yields a policy that is the ideal point of the median voter of that country.
Our emphasis on commitment problems under uncertainty is not novel. Inﬂuential
research demonstrates various ways in which commitment problems cause ineﬃciencies
in models of civil wars and political transitions; see, for example, Fearon (1998, 2004),
Powell (1999, 2004), and Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2001). This literature shows how
uncertainty about the future causes complete-information bargaining to break down in the
ineﬃcient use of power (Powell, 1994). In contrast, we are interested situations where the
source of the policy-maker’s commitment problem is asymmetric information (footnote 1).
The paper is organized as follows. The basic model is presented in Section 2. In Sections
3 and 4 we describe the equilibria, discuss the substantive implications of the results, and
provide two brief examples from Norway and Quebec to illustrate our arguments. Finally,
Section 5 presents extensions of the model and concludes.
2 The Model
To simplify the notation and facilitate the exposition, a basic model is presented ﬁrst,
and then extensions are considered. We consider a country populated by two territorially
concentrated and homogeneous groups of citizens, one of which holds a strict majority.
Call the two groups (as well as the regions they live in) ‘majority’ (M) and ‘minority’ (m).
Let nM and nm stand for the population proportions of the majority and the minority,
respectively, and let yM = y and ym = 1 be the per capita incomes of these two groups.
The political power is in the hands of the majority but the minority group, although
smaller, can unilaterally secede if not satisﬁed. Every citizen’s preferences depend on her
available income, composed of income net of taxes/transfers under unity (j = u), and
net of the secession cost under separation (j = s). The latter cost is the main reason
why both the minority and the majority may value continued integration in the existing
state. The economic losses associated with secession depend on the realization of a state
variable θ ∈ [0,1], whose c.d.f. G has a continuous and strictly positive density g over [0,1].
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Secession
occurs if j = s
Figure 1: Timing
majority region, and therefore its ability to provide the minority region with economic
advantages. The value of θ is known to the government but not to the citizens. Members
of the minority also derive utility beneﬁts from political independence, measured by the
parameter β ∈ (0,1).
One citizen from the majority is selected to act as the ‘policy-maker.’ Since all citizens
in the majority are the same, the identity of this representative agent is immaterial and
hence the selection process can be ignored. Once in oﬃce, she observes the realization
of θ and makes a proposal t for the redistribution of income from region M to region
m (negative transfers being interpreted as exploitative behavior). This is the policy that
takes eﬀect if the minority region does not secede. The minority region responds to the
policy-maker’s proposal by selecting (at random) a ‘minority leader.’ The latter then takes
a decision j from the set {u,s}, where j = u denotes continued unity and s separation. A
secession occurs if and only if j = s. The timing of events is summarized in Figure 1.






1 − θ + β if j = s
1 + t






y − ℓ(θ) if j = s
y − t if j = u ,
where γ ≡ nm/nM, and ℓ ∈ C1[0,1] is a strictly decreasing function with ℓ(1) = 0 (i.e., the
majority always prefers unity). Nothing of qualitative substance hinges on the linearity
7of the minority’s loss function. We also assume that ℓ(0) < γβ. This assumption seems
appropriate substantively (it ensures, as we might expect, there is no room for compromise
when the minority derives no economic beneﬁt from unity), and it eliminates cases in which
the model has no equilibrium.
This framework describes a sequential game of incomplete information with two players:
the policy-maker and the minority leader. The equilibrium concept we employ is that of
a (pure strategy) perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE). As beliefs are unrestricted for oﬀ-
the-equilibrium-path policy-maker proposals, a wide variety of equilibria exist. In order to
eliminate equilibria which rely on implausible beliefs oﬀ the equilibrium path, we impose
Cho and Kreps’ (1987) criterion D1.3 Roughly, it imposes that if the set of minority leader’s
responses that make the type-θ policy-maker willing to deviate to some t′ is strictly smaller
than the set of responses that make the type-θ′ policy-maker willing to deviate, then the
leader should believe that type θ′ is inﬁnitely more likely to deviate to t′ than type θ is
(Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991). Hereafter, we require any PBE to satisfy criterion D1. And
to avoid repeatedly having to include the relevant qualiﬁcation, we leave it as understood
that any reference to an “equilibrium” is to a PBE consistent with criterion D1.4
3 Inevitable Secessions
Although the eﬀect of minority uncertainty about the economic consequences of a secession
is our primary interest, we start with the case without uncertainty which provides a useful
benchmark. If the realization of the state is common knowledge, there is nothing for
the policy-maker to bluﬀ about. The choice for the policy-maker is to either propose a
policy t that dissuades the minority from seceding, in which case she receives a payoﬀ of
y −t, or propose a policy that causes a secession and consequently receive y −ℓ(θ). In the
former case, the policy-maker optimally oﬀers the minority just enough to make separation
3This is a strengthening of the Intuitive Criterion, the latter having no bite in this game. The formal
deﬁnition of the criterion D1 is relegated to the Appendix.
4In order to limit the number of possible cases (without aﬀecting the paper’s message), we also assume
that an indiﬀerent player will choose to induce unity rather than separation.
8unproﬁtable, i.e., it selects a policy t = γ(β − θ). Optimality of the policy-maker’s policy
choice therefore requires that for all θ ∈ [0,1]: (i) if the policy-maker prefers to maintain
unity, i.e.,
y − γ(β − θ) ≥ y − ℓ(θ) ,
then it proposes t = γ(β − θ); and (ii) if the inequality is reversed, she proposes some
policy t > γ(β − θ), thereby causing secession. Putting this discussion together, we have:
Observation 1. In the absence of informational asymmetry about the realization of the
state, secession occurs in state θ ∈ [0,1] if and only if γ(β − θ) > ℓ(θ).
Consider now the game with incomplete information. The realization of θ is known
to the policy-maker but not the minority leader. Upon observing the proposal by the
policy-maker, however, the leader updates her beliefs, with the distribution function   G(·|t)
representing updated beliefs conditional on any observed proposal t. Her equilibrium
strategy is trivial: the leader chooses to maintain political unity if and only if proposal t






θd   G(θ|t)
)
. (1)
In contrast to the complete-information benchmark, the minority leader’s decision de-
pends on updated beliefs,   G(·|t), so that these beliefs also inﬂuence the optimal transfer
t that the policy-maker proposes. Policy proposals are now used by the policy-maker as
a signaling device. Our next result establishes that this signaling process makes secession
an inevitable outcome in equilibrium. To understand the logic behind this result, it is
useful to begin with some simple observations about equilibrium policy proposals. A ﬁrst
observation is that there is at most one equilibrium proposal in T ≡ {t : t satisﬁes (1)}.
To see this, note that the policy-maker’s payoﬀ to oﬀering such a proposal, say t, is y − t
for all t ∈ T. As a consequence, an equilibrium proposal belonging to T (if there is one)
must be equal to t0 ≡ inf T. A second observation is that if the policy-maker proposes t0
in some state θ, then ℓ(θ) ≥ t0. This ensures that the policy-maker would not be better
oﬀ deviating to proposals outside T.
9With these two observations in place, a third observation can be established: If t0 is
proposed in equilibrium, then it must be proposed in several states. Suppose instead that
there is a single state, say θ0, in which the policy-maker oﬀers t0. Although the realization of
the state is unobservable to the minority leader, the policy-maker’s equilibrium proposal in
state θ0 reveals this information perfectly: the leader’s posteriors   G(·|t0) attach probability
one to the state being θ0. From the previous observations, therefore, γ (β − θ0) ≤ t0 ≤
ℓ(θ0), from which it follows that θ0 > 0 (recall that ℓ(0) < γβ). But this in turn implies
that, in any state θ < θ0, the policy-maker would be better oﬀ to imitate the ‘state-θ0
policy-maker,’ thus obtaining a payoﬀ of y − t0 ≥ y − ℓ(θ0) > y − ℓ(θ); a contradiction.
The key point here is that is impossible for higher-state policy-makers to escape mimicry
by the lower-state policy-makers.
Our fourth and ﬁnal observation concerns equilibria in which t0 is proposed by the
policy-maker in several states. It is proved in the appendix (Lemma 2) that such equilibria
do not exist. The central idea is that, in the highest state in which t0 is proposed, say ^ θ
the policy-maker can proﬁtably distinguish herself from lower-state policy-makers with a
deviation to a lower transfer t0 − ε. The minority leader believes that the policy-maker is













θd   G(θ|t0 − ε)
)
. (2)
It follows from the above inequalities that, for ε suﬃciently small, the minority leader
chooses not to secede when oﬀered t0 −ε, thus inducing the policy-maker to make such an
oﬀer in state ^ θ.
Together, these four observations establish that a secession is the only possible equi-
librium outcome in all states. The remaining issue in completing the proof of the result
involves the existence of an equilibrium in which a secession occurs in all states. As shown
in the Appendix, there is always a separating equilibrium in which the policy-maker’s
proposal fully reveals the value of the state and causes the minority to secede. Such an
equilibrium can be supported by beliefs giving probability 1 that the state is 0 for out-of-
equilibrium proposals. The formal proofs of this, and all other results, are contained in
10the appendix.
Proposition 1. In all equilibria of the game with asymmetric information, secession occurs
in every state θ ∈ [0,1].
Proposition 1 demonstrates the eﬀect of uncertainty about the state on the decision to
secede. Uncertainty leads the minority leader to make inferences based on policy proposals.
High-state policy-makers do not want to be confused with the low-state policy-makers,
which are more likely to make concessions to maintain unity. Thus, they propose extremely
low transfers to the minority to clearly distinguish themselves from the low-state policy-
makers. If the minority leader accepts such proposals, mimicry is proﬁtable to the low-
state policy-makers which then try to pool with the high-state policy-makers. This in turn
induces the latter to reduce their oﬀers further, thus causing the minority to secede.
Before we proceed any further, it may be worth drawing out some normative implica-
tions of the equilibrium described in Proposition 1. A clear comparison can be made with
the (eﬃcient) equilibrium without uncertainty: Uncertainty and signaling lead to ineﬃ-
cient secessions in all states θ such that γ(β −θ) < ℓ(θ). In such states, imposing political
unity under a policy t ∈ (γ(β − θ),ℓ(θ)) would generate a Pareto-improvement.
4 Minority Protection
The key implication of the above analysis is that, absent any limitation on policy choices,
the policy-maker faces a commitment problem: signaling incentives drive the policy-maker
to try to extract too many policy concessions from the minority, thus triggering unwanted
secessions. In view of the full-information equilibrium outcome, this suggests potential
beneﬁts from minority protection (or minimum transfer) legislation. In this section, we
show that the majority group itself may have an incentive to encourage such legislation.5
Concrete examples may be useful at this point.6 Norway’s secession from Sweden
5In this paper, we ignore the fundamental problem of why constitutional rules can constitute obdurate
commitment devices. We refer the reader to Ferejohn and Sager (2003) for an in-depth discussion of these
issues.
6The two examples mentioned here are drawn from Bartkus (1999).
11(1905) emerged from conﬂicting conceptions about the respective rights and duties of the
two partners within the union and, arguably, was heavily inﬂuenced by Sweden’s inability
to credibly commit to equal privileges in diplomatic representation. After a decade of
fruitless negotiations, a compromise was almost reached when Norwegian and Swedish
leaders signed a general agreement in 1903. But the Swedish government reneged on its
commitments in 1904, thus prompting new Norwegian protests which eventually lead to
Norway’s secession in 1905. This historical example ﬁts the claim made by Proposition
1 that, in the absence of obdurate constitutional rules protecting the minority’s rights,
strategic incentives drive the policy-maker to implement policies which cause secession
(even if this means reneging on previous agreements). Although the Norwegian example
seems to support such a claim, the question remains of whether the ruling majority can
ﬁnd it optimal to adopt binding constitutional rules protecting the secessionist minority
and preserve unity.
The example of Quebec suggests the answer to this question is positive. In the 1960s
and 1970s, the Canadian government was confronted with escalating secessionist threats
emanating from Quebec, whose citizens resented linguistic and political discrimination as
well as social inequalities. Nevertheless, important constitutional and institutional reforms
accommodating Quebecers’ aspirations for greater political and cultural autonomy have
served to preserve the unity of the country.
To establish these claims formally, consider ﬁrst the possibility that the minority group’s
interests are protected by exogenous constitutional arrangements, which impose a lower
bound T on the level of the transfers the policy-maker can set. To see the role of lower
bound T from an intuitive viewpoint, let us return to our fourth observation in Section
3. If t0 = T, then the deviation to t0 − ε, although still proﬁtable, is no longer feasible.
The equilibrium can then be supported by ‘pessimistic beliefs’ oﬀ the equilibrium path —
i.e., any deviation t > t0 by the policy-maker is followed by the belief that θ = 0 with
probability 1. This broad intuition is conﬁrmed and developed in:










(i) If T ≥ T(γ,β,G), then there exists a unique equilibrium in which policy t = T is
proposed and enacted in all states θ ∈ [0,1];
(ii) if T < T(γ,β,G), then there is a unique equilibrium outcome: Secession occurs in
all states θ ∈ [0,1].
Thus, the country remains united if and only if the lower bound on the policy-maker’s
policy is suﬃciently large. The condition that “T ≥ T(γ,β,G)” has a straightforward
interpretation: it means simply that the transfer to the minority is at least as much as the
latter expects to get from seceding (as in condition (1)).
Combined with Proposition 1, Proposition 2 suggests that the majority might, before
the policy-maker observes the state and proposes a policy, advocate a constitutional rule
that constrains the latter to set transfers above a certain level T. To explore this issue, we
now modify the previous model by adding a constitution-maker who has the power to set
T before the realization of the state. She is assumed to be a member of the majority.
The choice for the constitution-maker is to either select an arbitrary lower bound T <
T(γ,β,G), which induces secession, or select T = T(γ,β,G) and thus maintain unity.
Choosing any T > T(γ,β,G) is dominated by simply choosing T(γ,β,G). Therefore, she
will optimally choose T = T(γ,β,G) if and only if




We record this as:




[ℓ(θ) + γθ]dG(θ) , (4)
and some arbitrary T < T(γ,β,G) otherwise.
Simple comparative statics analysis of the equilibrium yields insights into how the
parameters aﬀect the relative desirability of preventing or inducing secession. It is clear
13from the discussion above that the desirability of maintaining unity decreases as T(·), the
minimum transfer needed to dissuade the minority from seceding, increases. Equation (3)
shows that increasing β, the strength of the desire for independence, increases this transfer,
thereby making political unity less valuable to the constitution-maker. A brief inspection
of (3) also reveals that the transfer T(·) is a monotonic function of γ, the relative size of
the minority: an increasing function if the intrinsic beneﬁt from independence β is greater
than the expected economic loss — in which case, each member of the majority gives
T(·) > 0 to the minority — and a decreasing function if the beneﬁt from independence
is smaller than the expected loss — in which case, each member of the majority receives
−T(·) > 0 from the minority. An increase in γ, therefore, decreases [resp. increases] the
attractiveness of maintaining unity in the former [resp. latter] case.
Equation (4) shows that two opposing eﬀects shape the impact of citizens’ prior be-
liefs about secession costs, G, on the attractiveness to the constitution-maker of setting
T = T(γ,β,G). A ﬁrst-order stochastic increase in the prior distribution of θ — i.e., higher
realizations of the state are more likely — reduces T(γ,β,G) and leads the constitution-
maker to seek political unity, but at the same time it also reduces the majority’s expected
loss from a secession and then dampens the willingness of the constitution-maker to main-
tain unity. The net impact of these two opposing eﬀects depends on the shape of the loss
function. For instance, the former eﬀect dominates if the majority’s secession loss is not
too sensitive to variations in the state: |ℓ′| < γ.
5 Extensions and Concluding Remarks
We have deliberately chosen the simplest model setting in which to describe an incomplete-
information theory of secession crises, one that captures in a very simple way the crucial
role of uncertainty about the consequences of secession. There doubtless are other factors
at work in secession crises. The simplicity of the model notwithstanding, the overall pic-
ture that emerges is suggestive. It is one in which: (i) informational asymmetries between
policy-makers and minority leaders and the signaling process they engender are conducive
to secession; (ii) obdurate constitutional arrangements protecting the minority are nec-
14essary to prevent secession when such signaling incentives exist; (iii) minority protection
may emerge from the will of the majority group itself; and (iv) the occurrence and level
of minority protection depend on the interaction between the minority’s intrinsic desire
for independence, the relative size of the minority, and citizens’ beliefs about the potential
costs of separation.
We conclude by brieﬂy discussing three possible extensions of the model which assess
the robustness of the results above and provide further insights.
Informed minority leader. We assumed that the minority leader cannot observe
anything other than the policy-maker’s proposal. Suppose now that when the state θ is
realized, the minority leader receives a signal equal to θ + ϵ, where ϵ is a random noise
distributed around a mean of zero with a variance σ2
ϵ. It is readily checked that, as long
as uncertainty is present (i.e., for any σ2
ϵ > 0), all of our conclusions continue to hold. The
reason for this is that it is the presence of uncertainty itself, and not its magnitude, which
is the key in creating the policy-maker’s signaling incentives: Whenever σ2
ϵ > 0, the leader
is unsure of the the precise value of θ and consequently tries to infer the policy-maker’s
information from her policy choices.
Regional party formation. Fearon and van Houten (2002) also study a model in
which a regional unit can decide to withdraw if not satisﬁed with the transfers oﬀered
by the policy-maker. However, they assume that the region can only use the secession
threat if its inhabitants have ‘appointed’ (through majority voting) a regional party in a
preliminary stage.7 Suppose we modify our model by adding a prior stage in which the
minority group decides whether or not to appoint a leader. Then the minority will always
choose to appoint a leader in order to avoid the exploitative policies of an unconstrained
policy-maker. Even when they anticipate that secession will not occur (i.e., when condition
(4) holds), the members of the minority will appoint a secessionist leader so as to induce
the constitution-maker to impose minority protection rules. Commenting on the separatist
Parti Quebecois’s succes in Quebec general election on November 30, 1998, Gilles Paquet
7In his study of secessionist parties in democratic countries, Sorens (2004) ﬁnds that central governments
have oﬀered autonomy more often to regions with secessionist parties than to regions without such parties.
15said: “what you saw today is the rational vote by a group that feels it can do better in the
Canadian federation by electing a separatist government.”8
Repression and international hostility. In our model, the minority can unilaterally
withdraw when dissatisﬁed with the policy-maker’s choices. Although it is not always the
case (e.g., Norway, Macedonia, Slovakia),9 state resistance has been a common feature
of secession attempts, often devolving into armed conﬂict and large-scale violence (e.g.,
South Sudan, Bangladesh, Chechnya, Kosovo).10 Another obstacle to secession is the
hostility of the international community toward secession — e.g. the Katangan crisis
in Congo (1960-1961) and the Biafran crisis in Nigeria (1966-1970). How would such
obstacles aﬀect the risk of secession? A thorough answer to this question cannot be oﬀered
in a paper of this length, for conﬂicts themselves are immensely complex phenomena. But
one can reasonably speculate that, in our model, adding an extra stage with state and/or
international opposition to group m’s secession attempts would essentially boil down to
modifying secession costs in the initial signaling game. The new loss functions (induced
from the extra stage), say ~ ℓM(θ) and ~ ℓm(θ), would basically have the same properties as
the current loss functions and would not qualitatively change our results.
Appendix
Preliminaries: D1 Signaling Equilibria
Following Ramey (1996), we deﬁne a PBE of the baseline model described in Section 2 as
a triple
(
σM,σm,   G
)
such that:
(i) σM : [0,1] → R is the policy-maker’s strategy. This function is a best response
in that for each type θ, the policy-maker’s proposal σM(θ) is optimal given the minority
leader’s strategy σm.
8New York Times, December 1, 1998. Gilles Paquet is Professor at the University of Ottawa and regular
commentator on national aﬀairs in the Canadian media.
9See Young (1994) for a comparative survey of peaceful secessions.
10See Collier and Hoeﬄer (2006) for a quantitative analysis.
16(ii) The distribution function   G(·|t) gives the minority leader’s posterior beliefs condi-
tional on any observed policy-maker proposals t. If t ∈ σM ([0,1]) satisﬁes
∫
{θ:σM(θ)=t}
dG(θ) > 0 ,
then   G(θ|t) is computed from the priors by Bayesian updating. If t ∈ σM ([0,1]) but the
above inequality is not satisﬁed, then the support of   G(·|t) must be equal to the closure of
{θ : σM(θ) = t}.
(iii) The minority leader’s strategy σm gives the probability σm(t) that the leader
chooses unity after observing policy proposal t. Given the leader’s posterior beliefs, σm is
required to maximize the latter’s expected utility.
In order to rule out PBEs supported by “unreasonable” beliefs oﬀ the equilibrium path,
we concentrate on pure strategy equilibria that satisfy Cho’ and Kreps’ (1987) criterion
D1 (see Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991, and Ramey, 1996). Fix an equilibrium, and let v∗
M(θ)
be the payoﬀ of the type-θ policy-maker in this equilibrium. Deﬁne D(θ,t) to be the set
of mixed-strategy best responses to t that make type θ strictly prefer t to her equilibrium
strategy, and D0(θ,t) to be the set of mixed best responses that make type θ exactly
indiﬀerent. A policy-maker type θ ∈ [0,1] is deleted — i.e., the minority leader places zero






Proof of Proposition 1
To prove that an equilibrium exists, consider a strategy proﬁle (^ σM, ^ σm) satisfying the
following conditions: (a) for all θ ∈ [0,1], ^ σM(θ) = γ(β−θ)−δ for some δ > 0; (b) ^ σm = 0.
In words: (a) In each state, the policy-maker proposes a transfer that reveals its type and
that is lower than the payoﬀ the minority get from seceding; and (b) the minority leader
opts for a secesion whatever the transfer chosen by the policy-maker.
It is readily checked that the assessment
(
^ σM, ^ σm,   G
)
is a PBE if the distribution
function   G(·|t) attaches probability one to type θ such that ^ σM(θ) = t, and attaches
probability one to type 0 for all t / ∈ ^ σM ([0,1]). What remains to be proved, therefore, is
17that this PBE satisﬁes D1.
Take an arbitrary type θ ∈ [0,1]. Let t′ / ∈ ^ σM ([0,1]), and let αm be a best response to





+ (1 − αm)[y − ℓ(θ)] ≥ y − ℓ(θ)
or, equivalently, αm [ℓ(θ) − t′] ≥ 0. This implies that
[
D(0,t′) ∪ D0 (0,t′)
]
⊇ D(θ,t′) for
all θ > 0: If t′ > ℓ(0) = max{ℓ(θ) : θ ∈ [0,1]}, then D(θ,t′) = ∅ for all θ ∈ [0,1]; if
t′ ≤ ℓ(0), then D(0,t′) ∪ D0 (0,t′) = [0,1]. This proves that   G is consistent with D1, thus
establishing that
(
^ σM, ^ σm,   G
)
is an equilibrium.




σM,σm,   G
)
be an equilibrium. A secession occurs in every state θ ∈ [0,1]
such that σM(θ) ̸= σM(θ′) for all θ′ ̸= θ.
Proof: Suppose that, contrary to statement of the lemma, there exist an equilibrium
(
σM,σm,   G
)
and a state θ0 ∈ [0,1] such that: t0 ≡ σM (θ0) ̸= σM(θ′) for all θ′ ̸= θ0,
and σm (t0) = 1. Note ﬁrst that there cannot be another transfer t in σM ([0,1]) such
that σm(t) = 1. To see this, suppose another policy-maker type, θ1, announces a transfer
t1 ̸= t0 such that σm (t1) = 1. If t0 < t1, type θ1 should then deviate to t0 < t1 ≤ ℓ(θ1).
Similarly, If t0 > t1, type θ0 should then deviate to t1 < t0 ≤ ℓ(θ0). This is a contradiction
with
(
σM,σm,   G
)
being an equilibrium.
Thus, t0 is the only transfer in σM ([0,1]) that does not cause a secession. Therefore,
θ0 = 0 and t0 = ℓ(0); otherwise, by continuity of ℓ, there would be a nonempty neighbor-
hood of θ0, 0 ≡ {θ ∈ [0,1] : ℓ(θ) > t0}, the members of which could proﬁtably deviate to




σM,σm,   G
)
be an equilibrium. A secession occurs in every state θ ∈ [0,1]
such that σM(θ) = σM(θ′) for some θ′ ̸= θ.
18Proof: Suppose that, contrary to the statement of the lemma, there exist an equilibrium
(
σM,σm,   G
)
and a state θ0 ∈ [0,1] such that: t0 ≡ σM (θ0) = σM(θ′) for some θ′ ̸= θ0,
and σm (t0) = 1. Let 0 ≡ {θ ∈ [0,1] : σM(θ) = t0}, and let ^ θ be the supremum of 0.
By the same reasoning as in the proof of Lemma 1 (ﬁrst paragraph), t0 must be the only
transfer that is not followed by a secession.
We now make two useful claims:





Proof: Suppose that, contrary to the statement of the claim, there exists a type θ < ^ θ
such that σM(θ) ̸= t0. By deﬁnition of a PBE, t0 ≤ ℓ(^ θ) < ℓ(θ). Therefore, the type-
θ policy-maker could proﬁtably deviate by announcing t0; a contradiction. This proves
that 0 ⊇ [0, ^ θ). Now, suppose that ^ θ / ∈ 0. By deﬁnition of a PBE, this implies that
y − ℓ(^ θ) ≥ y − t0 or, equivalently, ℓ(^ θ) ≤ t0. By continuity of ℓ, however, this in turn
implies that ℓ(^ θ) = t0 (otherwise ℓ(^ θ − ε) < t0 for ε suﬃciently small). This contradicts
our assumption that an indiﬀerent player always favors unity.
♢
Claim 2: For every t ∈
(
γ(β − ^ θ),t0
)
and every θ < ^ θ,
[
D(θ,t) ∪ D0 (θ,t)
]
⊂ D(^ θ,t).
Take an arbitrary θ ∈ 0 \ {^ θ}. Suppose that the type-θ policy-maker weakly prefers
t to t0 for some best response αm to t; that is:





∈ (0,1) . (5)
Since t < t0, the function  αm(x) ≡ (x − t0)/(x − t) is strictly increasing. Combined with
ℓ(^ θ) < ℓ(θ), (5) implies
αm >
ℓ(^ θ) − t0




D(θ,t) ∪ D0 (θ,t)
]
⊆ D(^ θ,t).
19To see that the inclusion is strict, note that any αm ∈ [0,1] can be a best response for






,  αm (ℓ(θ))
)
is an element of D(^ θ,t) \
[
D(θ,t) ∪ D0 (θ,t)
]
. This establishes the claim.
♢
We now return to the proof of the main result. Consider a deviation by type ^ θ to some
transfer t belonging to the open interval
(
γ(β − ^ θ),t0
)
— which, by Claim 1, is nonempty.
By Claim 2, the minority’s equilibrium beliefs must attribute probability 1 to the policy-




(criterion D1). Therefore, σm(t) = 1. Type ^ θ’s deviation
to t < ℓ(^ θ) is consequently proﬁtable; a contradiction. This completes the proof of lemma
2.
 
Combining Lemmas 1 and 2, we obtain Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 2
We begin with a useful lemma.
Lemma 3. The following statements are true for any exogenous lower bound T on the
policy-maker’s transfer:
(i) In any equilibrium, a secession occurs in either all or none of the states in [0,1].
(ii) There exists an equilibrium in which the country remains united if and only if
T ≥ T(γ,β,G). In such an equilibrium, policy t = T is proposed and enacted in all states
θ ∈ [0,1].
Proof: Consider an equilibrium
(
σM,σm,   G
)
in which the country remains united in
some state θ0: σm (t0) = 1 where t0 ≡ σM (θ0). Then t0 must be the unique policy proposal
in the range of σM that is not followed by a secession in equilibrium (see proof of Lemma
1).
Our next step is to prove that t0 = T. Let 0 be the set of types that propose t0
in equilibrium, and let ^ θ be the highest type in 0. Suppose that t0 > T, and consider
20a deviation to T by types θ < ^ θ. By the same argument as in the proof of Lemma 2,
members of 0 (except ^ θ) must be deleted according to criterion D1. Consider then types
θ < ^ θ which are outside 0. If, given some best response αm, they weakly prefer proposal
T to their equilibrium payoﬀ, then they weakly prefer T to t0, i.e.:
αm(y − T) + (1 − αm)[y − ℓ(θ)] ≥ y − t0 .
Since ℓ(^ θ) < ℓ(θ), this implies that type ^ θ must strictly prefer proposing T to its equilibrium
payoﬀ (which is y − t0). This in turn implies that, upon observing T, the minority leader
should attach zero probability to types θ < ^ θ. As a consequence, type ^ θ can proﬁtably
deviate to T; a contradiction.
An immediate consequence of t0 = T is that {θ ∈ [0,1] : ℓ(θ) > T} ⊆ 0 — otherwise,
any type θ with ℓ(θ) > T could proﬁtably deviate by proposing T instead of σM(θ).
Consider now types in [0,1]\0. When the minority leader observes some proposal t > T
in equilibrium, she infers that the policy-maker’s type is greater than ^ θ. Since 1 + t >
1+T ≥ γ(β − ^ θ) > γ (β − θ) for all θ / ∈ 0, she must optimally choose u; a contradiction.
We have thus established that if the country remains united in some state, then it
remains united (and policy t = T prevails) in all states. Evidently, T ≥ T(γ,β,G) is a
necessary condition for σm (T) = 1 to be a best response to σM. This establishes the
necessity conditions stated in Proposition 2.
To see that T ≥ T(γ,β,G) is also a suﬃcient condition for such an equilibrium to exist,
consider the following beliefs (oﬀ the equilibrium path): for all t > T,   G(θ|t) = 0 for all
θ < 1. That is, the minority leader attaches probability one to type θ = 1 whenever she
observes a proposal greater than T. It is easily seen that, when T ≥ T(γ,β,G), such beliefs
support (σM,σm) as a PBE strategy proﬁle. We must now check that   G is consistent with
D1, i.e., that type 1 cannot be deleted. Take an arbitrary deviation t > T. As D(θ,t) = ∅
whenever ℓ(θ) ≥ T, we can restrict attention to types in    ≡ {θ ∈ [0,1] : ℓ(θ) < T}.
Suppose that type θ ∈    weakly prefers t to T for some best response αm to t; that is:
αm(y − t) + (1 − αm)[y − ℓ(θ)] ≥ y − T .
21Since ℓ′ < 0, this implies that type 1 strictly prefers t to T:
αm(y − t) + (1 − αm)[y − ℓ(1)] > y − T .
This proves that   G is consistent with criterion D1, thus ending the proof of the lemma.
 
Suppose ﬁrst that T ≥ T(γ,β,G). By Lemma 3(ii), there is a unique equilibrium
in which the minority group never secedes. To prove part (i) in Proposition 2, we must
then show that there is no equilibrium in which a secession may not occur. Suppose by
contradiction that such an equilibrium, say
(
σM,σm,   G
)
, exists. Lemma 3(i) then ensures
that a secession occurs in all states. By deﬁnition of a PBE, therefore,





θd   G(θ|t)
)
for all t ∈ σM ([0,1]). But this is a contradiction with T ≥ T(γ,β,G).
Suppose now that T < T(γ,β,G). Lemma 3(ii) tells us that there can only be equilibria
in which a secession occurs in all states. It is readily checked that a situation in which
policy t = T is proposed and followed by a secession in all states can be supported as
an equilibrium by beliefs giving probability 1 that the state is 0 for out-of-equilibrium
proposals.
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